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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-3006 
_____________ 
 
JEWISH HOME OF EASTERN PA, 
 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
SERVICES; 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
 
Respondents 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an Order by the Secretary 
of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(No. 09-42) 
 
Submitted January 27, 2011 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and ROTH, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 2, 2011) 
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Christopher S. Lucas, Esquire 
2917 Glenwood Road 
Camphill, PA 17011 
 Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Alan C. Horowitz, Esquire 
United States Department of Health & Human Services 
Office of the General Counsel 
150 Independence Mall West 
The Public Ledger Building, Suite 418 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 Counsel for Respondent 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Jewish Home of Eastern Pennsylvania (―JHEP‖) 
petitions for review of a final decision of the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services affirming the 
imposition of civil monetary penalties for failure to be in 
substantial compliance with the Medicare and Medicaid 
Services participation requirements set forth in 42 C.F.R. 
§ 483.25(h)(2).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
 
I. 
 
JHEP provides nursing care to Medicare beneficiaries 
and, as a result, is required to comply with the mandatory 
health and safety requirements for participation in the 
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Medicare program.  In order to participate in the Medicare 
program, JHEP must submit to random surveys conducted by 
state departments of health to ensure that it meets all of the 
program requirements.  See 42 C.F.R. § 488.305.  On 
December 9, 2005, the Pennsylvania Department of Health, 
acting on behalf of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (―CMS‖), conducted a survey of JHEP.  The survey 
concluded that JHEP had eight regulatory deficiencies, 
including violations of 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(h)(2), which 
requires a facility to ensure that each resident receives 
adequate supervision and assistance with devices to prevent 
accidents.  Based on those deficiencies, the CMS imposed a 
$350 per day fine from December 9, 2005 through January 
26, 2006, totaling $17,150.  On October 16, 2006, the CMS 
performed another survey of JHEP and found twelve 
deficiencies for which it imposed a $400 per day fine 
effective from October 16, 2006 through November 16, 2006, 
totaling $12,800.
1
 
 
                                              
1
  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii), the 
CMS may impose a civil money penalty in an amount not to 
exceed $10,000 per day of noncompliance.  There are two 
categories of monetary penalties:  (1) ―Penalties in the range 
of $3,050–$10,000 per day are imposed for deficiencies 
constituting immediate jeopardy,‖ 42 C.F.R. 
§ 488.438(a)(1)(i); and (2) ―Penalties in the range of $50–
$3,000 per day are imposed for deficiencies that do not 
constitute immediate jeopardy, but either caused actual harm, 
or caused no actual harm, but have the potential for more than 
minimal harm,‖ 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(a)(1)(ii).   The penalties 
imposed in this case fell into the latter category.   
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On August 9, 2006 and October 20, 2006, JHEP 
appealed both civil monetary penalties to an Administrative 
Law Judge (―ALJ‖), arguing that the allegations of 
noncompliance were based on the inadmissible disclosure of 
―privileged‖ quality assurance records and that the monetary 
penalties violated its right to equal protection because they 
were the product of selective enforcement based on race and 
religion.  The ALJ denied JHEP’s motion to suppress the 
quality assurance records, which consisted of event report 
forms and witness interview statements that accompanied 
those reports (collectively, ―Event Reports‖).  Prior to the 
administrative trial, JHEP stipulated that it failed to provide 
the necessary supervision or assistive devices to three of its 
residents and presented no testimony as to these residents.  
After a two-day trial in June 2008, the ALJ upheld the fines 
against JHEP and also found that JHEP was noncompliant in 
its care of two additional residents.  The ALJ found that JHEP 
was not in substantial compliance with the participation 
requirements during the relevant time periods and declined to 
consider the equal protection claim because he lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear substantive constitutional claims.  
 
JHEP timely filed an appeal to the Departmental 
Appeals Board which, on June 18, 2009, affirmed both of the 
civil monetary penalties.  Thereafter, on July 10, 2009, JHEP 
filed the current petition for review.
2
   
 
II. 
 
                                              
2
  We have jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e). 
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 On review by this Court, the Secretary’s factual 
findings ―if supported by substantial evidence on the record 
considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.‖  42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7a(e).  ―[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere 
scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‖  
Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 
1986) (quotation marks omitted).  We may overturn the 
Secretary’s action only if it is ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖  5 
U.S.C. § 706(2); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504, 512 (1994).   
 
III. 
 
 Notably, JHEP does not contest the finding that it was 
not in substantial compliance with the Medicare program 
during the relevant survey periods.  Instead, JHEP argues that 
CMS’s findings and penalties are invalid because they (1) are 
based on quality assurance documents that should not have 
been disclosed, and (2) are a result of racial and religious 
discrimination.  We conclude that both of JHEP’s grounds for 
review are unfounded.   
 
A. 
 
  JHEP maintains that the incident reports in question 
were generated by its Quality Assurance Committee, and as 
such, are subject to disclosure and use restrictions under the 
Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments (―FNHRA‖), 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(B).  Section 1396r(b)(1)(B) mandates 
that the nursing facility have a quality assessment and 
assurance team that ―meets at least quarterly to identify issues 
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with respect to which quality assessment and assurance 
activities are necessary‖ and ―develops and implements 
appropriate plans of action to correct identified quality 
deficiencies.‖  In order to promote an effective quality review 
process, the FNHRA provides that  
 
A State or the Secretary may not require 
disclosure of the records of such committee 
except insofar as such disclosure is related to 
the compliance of such committee with the 
requirements of this subparagraph. 
 
Id.  The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(B), as a result, 
limits the scope of protection from discovery to the records 
generated by the Quality Assurance Committee.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Boone Ret. Ctr. v. Hamilton, 946 S.W.2d 740, 
743 (Mo. 1997) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(B) 
―protects the committee’s own records — its minutes or 
internal working papers or statements of conclusions — from 
discovery.  No honest reading of the statute, however, can 
extend the statute’s privilege to records and materials 
generated or created outside the committee and submitted to 
the committee for its review.‖).   
 
After reviewing the record presented, we hold that the 
documents in question were contemporaneous, routinely-
generated incident reports that were part of the residents’ 
medical records and were not minutes, internal papers, or 
conclusions generated by the Quality Assurance Committee.  
The ALJ found that the Event Reports were given to JHEP’s 
Quality Assurance Committee at the time of the surveys and 
were not produced by or at the behest of the Quality 
Assurance Committee.  JHEP has presented no evidence to 
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suggest otherwise.  Notably, Dr. Barry Fogel’s affidavit, upon 
which JHEP places much emphasis, simply does not state that 
the Event Reports were created by or at the direction of the 
Quality Assurance Committee.  Appendix (―App.‖) 203.   
 
Moreover, the Departmental Appeals Board pointed 
out that federal regulations require nursing home facilities to 
investigate and report incidents ―involving mistreatment, 
neglect, or abuse, including injuries of unknown source, and 
misappropriation of resident property.‖  42 C.F.R. § 
483.13(c)(2).  As the Departmental Appeals Board reasoned, 
―[i]t would be strange indeed if the very documentation which 
a facility is required to generate for that purpose were also 
shielded from those very regulators whenever it has been 
reviewed by a [Quality Assurance] Committee . . . .‖  App. 
13.  For these reasons, we hold that the disputed evidence was 
not subject to the FNHRA disclosure restrictions.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s findings are 
―supported by substantial evidence on the record considered 
as a whole.‖  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e). 
 
B. 
 
 JHEP also alleges that the issuance of civil monetary 
fines violated its right to equal protection because the fines 
were the result of selective enforcement based on race and 
religion.
3
  We conclude that this argument is meritless and, as 
such, we will provide only a brief discussion. 
                                              
3
  While JHEP is a non-denominational facility, JHEP 
argues that it may maintain an equal protection claim because 
of its association with a protected group — persons of Jewish 
ancestry.   
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Selective discriminatory enforcement of a facially 
valid law is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886); Holder v. City of 
Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1993).  To establish a 
selective enforcement claim, JHEP must show (1) that it was 
treated differently from another, similarly situated facility, 
and (2) ―that this selective treatment was based on an 
unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other 
arbitrary factor, . . . or to prevent the exercise of a 
fundamental right.‖  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 
184 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  Hence, to 
maintain an equal protection claim of this sort, JHEP must 
provide evidence of discriminatory purpose, not mere unequal 
treatment or adverse effect.  Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 
8 (1944).  JHEP must show that the ―decisionmaker . . . 
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects.‖  
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
JHEP relies upon three documents to prove its 
selective enforcement claim.  First, JHEP submits side-by-
side comparisons of citations issued to JHEP and other local 
facilities.  Second, JHEP provides a statistical report which 
concluded that the number of citations issued to JHEP was 
high in comparison to other facilities surveyed from the 
Scranton Field Office and that the disparity was likely the 
result of bias and not likely the result of differences in the 
quality of care, error, or chance.  Third, JHEP presents the 
affidavit of an employee who claims that a CMS surveyor 
made a discriminatory statement in October 2004, over a year 
before the surveys in question.  Specifically, in surveying 
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whether JHEP provided activities on Saturdays for residents 
of all denominations, the surveyor was told that there was a 
Kiddush — a ceremony involving a blessing and food that all 
individuals were invited to regardless of their religious 
affiliations.  According to the employee, the surveyor 
responded that she was Christian and would feel 
uncomfortable attending such an activity.   
 
   We hold that JHEP has failed to establish a claim for 
selective enforcement under the Equal Protection Clause.  
JHEP has not demonstrated that CMS issued fines with an 
discriminatory purpose.  We find JHEP’s reliance on the 
surveyor’s alleged statement to be misplaced, as it was clearly 
taken out of context, was not contemporaneous to the surveys 
in question, and was not relevant or facially discriminatory.  
Additionally, JHEP has failed to show that it was treated 
differently from other similarly situated facilities.  Therefore, 
we conclude that JHEP’s equal protection claim has no merit. 
IV. 
 
  After considering all of JHEP’s arguments, we will 
deny JHEP’s petition for review. 
 
